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*1771 I. Introduction: The Grammarian's Dilemma
  These days, the Academie francaise is increasingly worried about hot
dogs. More correctly, it is worried about "le hot dog," an example of the
increasingly prevalent phenomenon of "Franglais." The Academie, the official
arbiter of the French language, has grown increasingly concerned over the use of
American words and expressions by French speakers. Indeed, it is not only the
denizens of the Academie who are expressing alarm. In an article suitably entitled
"A Bas Anglais! From Now On, It's the Law!,"1 the New York Times reported that
not only had the French Parliament felt it necessary to add to the French
Constitution the sentence "The language of the Republic is French,"2 but that 300
leading intellectuals, including the playwright Eugene Ionesco and radical critic
Regis Debray, had issued a statement decrying the infusion of alien words into
pure French as a "process of collective self- destruction."3
                                                
a1 Lafayette S. Foster Professor, Yale Law School.
aa1 W. St. John Garwood & W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Regents Chair in
Law, University of Texas Law School. The authors would like to thank Dennis
Patterson for his comments on previous draft.
1 Alan Riding, A Bas Anglais! From Now On, It's the Law!, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 1992, ' 1, at 3.
2 Lest there be any misunderstanding, the sentence actually reads "La
langue de la Republique est le francais." CONST. art. 2 (Fr.).
3 Riding, supra note 1, at 3. Soon after the amendment took effect, the
French National Assembly passed a law banning the use of foreign words in
broadcasting and advertising and prescribing official French translations for
commonly used Franglais phrases. Decret du 30 Juin, 1994, Journal Officiel de le
Republique Francaise 9480 (Fr.); Scott Kraft, Jacques Toubon: Defending the
French Language Against All Interlopers, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1994, Opinion
Sec., at 3; Marlise Simons, Bar English? French Bicker on Barricades, N.Y. TIMES,
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  How should one describe what the Academie, the French Parliament,
and scores of French intellectuals are doing? We might view them as *1772
monitors of the purity of public language, a sort of cultural police. They seek to
maintain French language and hence French culture against trespass by outside
elements. The metaphor of trespass is used advisedly, for in this conception
language and culture become a sort of property that can be stolen, squandered, or
debased, and hence must be vigilantly safeguarded. Enoch Powell, a former
member of the British Parliament well known for his xenophobia, made this
comparison explicitly. He asserted that although "[o]thers may speak and read
English— more or less— . . . it is our language not theirs. It was made in England
by the English and it remains our distinctive property . . . ."4 As the owners of the
language, the English presumably have the right to regulate the speech of the
millions of English speakers who live well beyond England's borders.
  Powell and his counterparts are unabashedly normative in their focus,
as, indeed, are most police. Many grammarians,5 however, would define their task
more descriptively: They seek merely to understand the existing structures of a
language, including the inevitable changes that occur in any living system of
communication. As a result, the grammarian inevitably faces a theoretical and
practical difficulty. New meanings and usages arise all the time. Moreover,
mistakes made often enough by enough people eventually become not errors, but
examples of proper speech. Yet it is hardly the case that "anything goes" within a
given language: There is always present a notion of mistake that allows one to
recognize errors and suggest what would count as correct speech. Thus, the
grammarian faces a dual task: She must faithfully reflect the positive norms of a
                                                                                                  
Mar. 15, 1994, at A1. France's constitutional court, however, struck down most
provisions of the law, ruling that constitutional provisions on freedom of
expression and communication do not allow the government to impose official
French translations on private citizens, companies, and the news media. Decision
94-345 DC du 29 Juillet, 1994, Le Conseil Constitutionnel, LEXIS, Public Library,
CONSTI File (Fr.); Vive L'Evolution! French Council Weakens Law Banning
Foreign Words, BOSTON GLOBE, National/Foreign, at 21, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BGLOBE File.
4 Sidney Greenbaum, Whose English?, in THE STATE OF THE
LANGUAGE 15, 15 (Christopher Ricks & Leonard Michaels eds., 1990) (quoting
Enoch Powell).
5 "Grammar" in this article refers not only to basic rules of syntax but
also to vocabulary itself. That is, we adopt the standard dictionary definition of
"grammar" as, among other things, "knowledge or usage of the preferred or
prescribed forms in speaking or writing" and the definition of "grammarian" as "a
person who has established standards of usage in a language." THE RANDOM
HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 573 (rev. ed. 1975).
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changing language while simultaneously offering normative judgments about
what usages are currently acceptable.
  Often these directives are conflicting, especially when language is
undergoing change—which, of course, it always is. For example, and much to the
chagrin of many traditionally educated English speakers, the words "impact" and
"interface" have left their appropriate role as nouns and become widely used (if
ungainly) verbs.6 As one who upholds the positive norms of language, the
grammarian must denounce this linguistic disfigurement. Nevertheless,
grammarians who protest such changes may find themselves as helpless and as
irrelevant as King Canute ordering the *1773 tides not to go forward. At some
point, misuse becomes common use, and common use becomes accepted use.7
Eventually, dictionaries and grammatical texts confirm and sanctify usages that
would have horrified previous generations who spoke what was then regarded as
proper English or proper French.
  One solution to this difficulty is to abandon the prescriptive project
entirely and simply to report, without comment, what has happened to the English
language. This was the approach taken, for example, in 1961 by the compilers of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary.8 Their decision in turn triggered a
great brouhaha in intellectual circles and produced accusations that the turn to
"descriptive linguistics" represented a fundamental betrayal of the normative duty
of lexicographers.9 According to their critics, descriptivists wrongly identify what
                                                
6 We can only feel that such changes have impacted the English
language for the worse, and we are more than willing to interface with anyone who
needs to be convinced about the ugliness of the sentence you are currently
reading.
7 One might offer as examples the gradual acceptance of "hopefully" to
mean "One hopes that" instead of "in a hopeful manner," see 7 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 378 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989), and
the collapse of the once important (and desirable) distinction between
"disinterested" and "uninterested," see 19 id. at 67 (defining "uninterested" as
meaning "unconcerned, indifferent" and noting that "[i]n this sense disinterested
is increasingly common in informal use, though widely regarded as incorrect"
(emphasis in original)).
8 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(UNABRIDGED) 4a (3d ed. 1961) ("The basic aim [of the dictionary] is nothing
less than coverage of the current vocabulary of standard written and spoken
English.").
9 See, for example Dwight MacDonald's classic critique, The String
Untuned, in AGAINST THE AMERICAN GRAIN 289 (1962).
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is with what should be. Popular might, rather than the tutelage of the learned,
makes grammatical right.
  Nevertheless, a strategy of pure description is equally problematic, both
as a positive and as a normative program. First, as a positive matter, there is never
a complete consensus on linguistic usage. Faced with variations in linguistic
practice, the grammarian has to determine which usages are within the bounds of
acceptability and which must be considered sufficiently "off the wall" to count as
grammatical mistakes or linguistic misuse. In other words, the grammarian must
inevitably fashion some kind of minimal rules from practice, and thus she must
take a normative stance on what will count as normal and what will count as
deviant. This process necessarily introduces important questions of judgment. If
her views are too idiosyncratic—for example, if she insists that "thou" is the only
correct second-person singular pronoun and that "you" is incorrect—she will be
dismissed as a crank. However, if she is too latitudinarian and regards all
sentences as equally grammatical— or each and every use or spelling of a word as
equally legitimate—she basically ceases to be a grammarian at all. So the
grammarian must make interpretive judgments about existing practices and about
the popular consensus—or, failing this, the nature of the enlightened
consensus— concerning proper usage.
  *1774 Second, as a normative matter, the grammarian has the right, just
as any other speaker does, to attempt to influence the course and development of
the language she studies. Thus, one who hears people using "impact" as a verb
and finds this usage unappealing has every right to offer her opinion that this is
not how the English language should develop. Seen in their best light, such
actions attempt to preserve the purity of a valuable common culture for the benefit
of all. Viewed more cynically, they are efforts by self-appointed elites to gain
cultural control over the masses through the invocation of invented traditions and
spurious notions of "purity."
  Although Americans may be amused by the pronouncements of the
Academie francaise, and its fear about the invasion of "le hot dog," that is
probably because we are at present net exporters of culture and language. Late-
twentieth-century America currently enjoys a cultural hegemony that France
believed it had in an earlier era. It is precisely this perception of American
hegemony that led the aforementioned group of French intellectuals to warn that
France faces the prospect of ending "in the same position as Quebec 30 years
ago—economic dependence, loss of social status, cultural inferiority and
linguistic debasement."10
  Interestingly, similar pronouncements and gloomy forecasts appear
increasingly within our own culture. For example, in debates about bilingual
education or the status of "black English," many speakers of "traditional" or
                                                
10 Riding, supra note 1, at 3.
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"establishment" English take a decidedly worried tone,11 sounding remarkably
like the anguished Francophone opponents of the American cultural World
invasion. The acceptance of "he be going" in popular conversation appears, if
anything, to be at least as troublesome to traditionalists as "he ain't." Thus, we
discover that far more than the forty "immortals" who populate the Academie find
grammar worth fighting about. Moreover, these combatants are not mere pedants;
they are self-consciously engaged in an ideological struggle at the deepest levels
of culture.
II. Constitutional Grammar and Constitutional Interpretation
  The idea that grammar is constitutive of culture, and hence worth
fighting about, brings us to the subject of this Symposium—the constitutional
theory of our colleague and friend Philip Bobbitt—and, more *1775 particularly,
his recent book, Constitutional Interpretation.12 It is our thesis that Bobbitt is
best understood as a grammarian of our constitutional culture, determined to
identify—and to police—the boundaries of what counts as the particular (and
sometimes peculiar) language of constitutional "law talk." After all, it is the ability
to use law talk appropriately that constitutes the constitutional lawyer in the same
way that the ability to employ French vocabulary and grammatical structures
constitutes the French speaker.
  More precisely, Bobbitt argues that the legitimacy of judicial review and
constitutional interpretation is guaranteed by the use of six particular forms of
constitutional argument, which he terms "modalities." These six forms are:
historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the
Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average
contemporary "man on the street"); structural (inferring rules from the
relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets
up); doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving
rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are
reflected in the Constitution); and prudential (seeking to balance the
costs and benefits of a particular rule).13
                                                
11 See Felicia R. Lee, Lingering Conflict in the Schools: Black Dialect vs.
Standard Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1994, at A1. For analysis of the conflict
surrounding language in America, see DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY
QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR AMERICANS? (1990); JAMES
CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE: BILINGUALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
"ENGLISH ONLY" (1992).
12 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
13 Id. at 12-13.
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For something to count as constitutional interpretation, it must, at least
within the legal culture of the contemporary United States, proceed within one of
these six modalities.
  Arguments couched in one or another (or all) of these modalities are
clothed with legitimacy, although they are not necessarily just.14 "Legitimacy" in
this sense means nothing more (or less) than that they are "well formed,"
grammatically appropriate and semantically meaningful within the linguistic
system of law talk. Of course, pronouncing a sentence as well formed says
nothing whatsoever about its justification. Justification is the assessment of
whether a legitimate utterance is in fact justified. Just as "all Jews should be
gassed" is a perfectly well-formed, albeit vicious and contemptible, sentence in
the English language, so is the statement "Supreme Court cases hold that
legislative majorities have a constitutional right to discriminate against
homosexuals" a perfectly well-formed, albeit vicious and contemptible, sentence in
the language of American law talk. The lay reader is apt to be confused by
Bobbitt's use of "legitimacy," for there is an almost irresistible temptation to
impute a moral valence to something that is "legitimate." However, Bobbitt insists
that this *1776 temptation must be resisted, at least if we want to understand how
our constitutional grammar works.15
  Bobbitt's constitutional grammar offers us a taxonomy of the paradigms
of arguments about the Constitution. It explains the available sorts of interpretive
arguments and how they are correctly deployed. In much of his book he plays the
careful grammarian, explaining how particular arguments are correctly classified
within one of his six forms and how positions offered by various scholars and
judges misunderstand these modalities or offer confused examples of them.
  Bobbitt's classificatory scheme is significant for two quite different
reasons. The first is its potential for use by a wide audience. Bobbitt wishes to
empower all the members of the legal system, including not only judges but also
legislators, executive officials, and especially laypersons, to engage in
constitutional interpretation.16 To this end, Constitutional Interpretation is
offered basically as a primer that will quickly teach ordinary citizens how to
interpret the U.S. Constitution. Even if they know nothing of constitutional
doctrine or the specifics of constitutional history, they can still participate in the
                                                                                                  
14 Id. at 8-9, 119.
15 Id. at 118-20.
16 Id. at 28-30.
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practice of constitutional interpretation because they can make textual, structural,
ethical, and prudential arguments.
  This feature of his project shows that Bobbitt is, in more ways than one,
deeply "protestant" in his approach to constitutionalism and constitutional
interpretation.17 He seeks to give each and every citizen the tools to participate in
discussions about the meaning of the Constitution. The book attempts to
contribute to the actual achievement of a "lawyerhood of all citizens" in a way that
should be warmly embraced by all others who join him in a protestant approach.
  Bobbitt's argument is also important for a second, more conventionally
jurisprudential reason: He believes that his modalities demarcate the boundaries
between legal argument and other kinds of argument,18 for example, political and
moral argument, in precisely the same way that one can distinguish a French
speaker from an English speaker. If arguments do not fit into one of the six
modalities, they are not legitimate—i.e., grammatical— forms of constitutional
argument. To be sure, they may be *1777 permissible forms of other kinds of
arguments. However, they do not qualify as law talk concerning the interpretation
of the Constitution. To use such arguments is to commit a sort of category
mistake, to shift the subject of the conversation from law to something else that,
however important or interesting, is not law. Hence, Bobbitt's constitutional
grammar is important not only as a source of common constitutional culture but
also as a way of demarcating the specifically legal from the larger political culture
and separating law from politics or morals. In this sense, Bobbitt seeks to purify
constitutional discourse of its political and non-legal aspects just as the Academie
francaise hopes to purify French of its Americanizations.
  One might compare Bobbitt's project with another one, "legal
semiotics," begun by persons associated with the Critical Legal Studies
movement.19 Legal semiotics asserts that lawyers' arguments fall into recurring
categories and that there are standard pro and con responses for each kind of
                                                
17 "Protestantism" in constitutional law involves the notion that the
meaning of the Constitution is not entrusted to a hierarchical elite, such as the
judiciary. Instead, the right and the duty to construe the meaning of the
Constitution is entrusted to the other branches of government and indeed, to all
citizens in a democratic polity. For a discussion of constitutional protestantism,
see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-30 (1988). One can be
a protestant with respect to the sources of institutional authority or duty to
interpret, with respect to the exclusivity of the meanings of the Constitution, or
with respect to both. Id.
18 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 22.
19 See Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX.L.REV. 1779,
1780-82 (1991).
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argument that can be applied repeatedly in different doctrinal settings. Legal
semioticians disagree among themselves about the point of this enterprise.20
However, a few legal semioticians, like Duncan Kennedy and James Boyle, have
argued that the goal of legal semiotics is to demystify the practice of legal
argument—to show that it is an inauthentic discourse that does not do the work
of deciding legal cases.21 Moreover, they believe that this analysis demonstrates
the close connections between legal analysis and political argument.22
  Although Bobbitt is also interested in classifying various forms of legal
argument, his purposes are quite different. He is attempting to explain the
legitimacy of ostensibly standard practices of constitutional argument. He does so
by making the basically Wittgensteinian point that the ground of legal discourse
must rest in the practice of legal discourse itself, rather than in some other feature
of the world.23 For Bobbitt it is no difficulty that *1778 all constitutional lawyers
make arguments that fall into one of six categories. Indeed, if they did not do so,
they would not be playing the language game of American constitutional
                                                
20 Compare Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 104 (1991) (viewing legal semiotics as an unmasking
critique that robs standard legal argument of its authenticity and
unselfconciousness) with J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69
TEX.L.REV. 1831 (1991) (viewing legal semiotics as a study of the cultural
practices of legal argumentation that also reveals the constituitive and ideological
nature of legal rhetoric).
21 DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 20-21
(1983); Kennedy, supra note 20, at 104; see James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts
Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1052-53 (1985) (asserting that the paired cliches
used in legal argument are a rhetorical device that fools the audience into
believing that solutions are derived from legal reasoning when in fact the
decisions are political or moral).
22 For criticisms of these positions, see Paul, supra note 19; Balkin, supra
note 20.
23 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 34-35. We use the word "explain," rather
than "demonstrate" or "argue for," in the previous sentence because, as we will
see, Bobbitt thinks legitimacy is not something that can be proved or established
through argument; it merely occurs when a practice is in place. This makes the
status of his own book unclear: Is Constitutional Interpretation itself an argument
for the legitimacy of our current practices, or is it rather merely a description of a
practice whose legitimacy is already and necessarily ensured by its existence? The
tension between these two projects the book might have—one prescriptive and
the other descriptive—will reappear continually throughout our discussion.
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interpretation. Thus, what Kennedy and Boyle see as evidence of legal
mystification and illegitimacy Bobbitt sees as the very conditions of legal
reasoning and judicial legitimacy. Conformity with these conditions (and only
these conditions) identifies a person as playing the language game of
constitutional argument rather than doing something else.
  We have described Bobbitt as a constitutional grammarian, setting forth
the rules of the language game of American constitutional interpretation.24 But,
like all grammarians, his project is a curious combination of the normative and the
descriptive. Thus, he may be offering a detached account of what our actual
practices of constitutional argument are; on the other hand, he may be offering an
account of what these practices should be in order to be counted as legitimate.25
In fact, as we shall see, he offers both kinds of accounts. This dual enterprise,
which creates tensions within the ordinary grammarian's project, proves even
more problematic for Bobbitt's theory of constitutional grammar.
III. Legitimacy and Justification
  The added difficulty arises because Bobbitt's theory also poses a
fundamental distinction between the legitimacy of the practice of constitutional
argument and the justification of decisions about what the Constitution means.
Bobbitt argues that our practices of constitutional argument provide their own
legitimacy because they are our practices and we live by and through them. This
is the deeper significance of the title of his earlier book, Constitutional Fate.26 The
six modalities of argument have been bequeathed to us by our national history
and our common law tradition; it is our constitutional fate to live and work within
them. The historically generated language game of constitutional law provides its
own norms of *1779 practice and hence provides its own source of legitimacy.27
                                                
24 See id. at 24 ("If we want to understand the ideological and political
commitments in law, we have to study the grammar of law, that system of logical
constraints that the practices of legal activities have developed in our particular
culture. A study of the modalities gives us such a description.").
25 See id. at 27 ("Once we looked carefully at constitutional argument, it
became apparent that the legitimacy of judicial review was maintained by
adherence to these forms of argument. An opinion stated in these terms was
accepted as legitimate and so also for briefs and oral arguments, whereas other
forms of argument, some acceptable in other legal cultures, rendered a decision
quite illegitimate . . . .").
26 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
27 Id. at 233-40.
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Legitimacy is ensured by playing by the rules of the language game of American
constitutional argument.
  It would follow, however, that any conventions of constitutional
argument, as long as they constituted a coherent practice, would also provide
norms of proper argument for persons who define themselves (or wish to be
perceived as) within the practice. Thus, if our practices were different, then so too
would be the norms of proper conduct within the practice. Under this logic, it
would be inappropriate to criticize the internal structure of a lived practice by
reference to the norms of another, hypothetical one. Each lived practice of
constitutional argument, because and to the extent that it is lived by us, is
self-contained and self-justifying. To the question of why one should follow the
existing practices of constitutional interpretation, the only answer would be
because that is just who we are and the way we do things.
  Within the practice itself, however, things are different. We can offer
arguments within the practice as to why one position that can be articulated
within the practice is better than another position. These are arguments of
justification. Thus, one justifies an interpretation of the Constitution through the
use of the sanctioned forms of constitutional law talk. However, one cannot prove
or demonstrate the legitimacy of the practice through the use of arguments wholly
within the practice. The legitimacy of the practice cannot be established by
argument; it is guaranteed by the fact that we practice it.
  Thus, one does not prove the legitimacy of a practice one is a part of;
legitimacy rests on the lived acceptance of the practice. Nevertheless, a legitimate
practice might be unjustified. We might believe that although the practice of
constitutional argument is established, it is an unjust practice. Yet this is not an
argument within the practice but about the practice. It is necessarily made outside
the practice. Thus, there are two kinds of arguments of justification that one can
make. The first are arguments of justification made within the practice; the second
are arguments made about the practice from outside the practice, but within some
other practice of argument.28 The former would be arguments about whether one
position or another is the best interpretation of the Constitution using the forms
and practices of constitutional argument.29 The latter would be arguments about
                                                
28 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 163, 176.
29 See id. at 169 ("[W]hen a constitutional decision is made, its moral
basis is confirmed if the forms of arguments can persuasively rationalize the
decision, and the decision is not made on grounds incompatible with the
conscience of the decisionmaker. That is constitutional decision according to
law.").
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whether the practice of constitutional *1780 law is justified, using arguments
characteristic of some other practice such as moral or political argument. 30
  This distinction is a consequence of Bobbitt's general view that
arguments are practice-bound. We use arguments within the practice to justify
positions statable within the practice according to the criteria that the practice
establishes. However, we cannot use arguments within the practice to justify the
practice itself. Instead, we would argue about the justification of the practice of
constitutional law using arguments internal to some other practice—for example,
moral or political theory. Thus, to justify an existing practice, or to argue about
how the practice could better be carried out, one must turn to a different practice
and the arguments of justification available within it.
  And here lies the problem. Although Bobbitt often speaks in the
detached voice of the cultural anthropologist who is merely describing the
elementary structures of legal life, we believe that this posture is seriously in
tension with the stated motivations behind his theory of the Constitution. Bobbitt
tells us that he wrote Constitutional Fate in response to "the assault on American
constitutional institutions commenced by the American right wing in the 1950s
and 60s."31 Ironically, in Bobbitt's view, " t his attempt to discredit the legitimacy
of our legal institutions was taken up by the cultural left in the early 1980's," and it
inspired the present book, Constitutional Interpretation.32 Bobbitt warns us that "
a t present the activities of the left have had one significant political impact: they
have enabled the right wing to lever a number of dubious propositions into
respectability because they seem, by contrast, common-sensical and even
unavoidable."33 These left- and right-wing attacks have called the legitimacy of
the institutions of American democracy into question. "To explicate and defend
these institutions," Bobbitt proudly states, "where they are explicable and
defensible, is a duty I inherited, as most of us come into title with things, partly by
the obligation of background and partly by the obligation of training."34
  Thus we see that Bobbitt's goal is not only to explicate, but also to
defend the existing practices of constitutional discourse from those who would
challenge or alter them, at least to the extent that these practices can be explained
and defended. His is a dual enterprise of description and prescription. However,
                                                
30 Id. at 163.
31 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at xii.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. (emphasis added).
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its duality poses serious problems with Bobbitt's distinction between justification
and legitimacy. Before offering specific examples of this tension, we first discuss
the general problem that he faces.
  *1781 To the extent that Bobbitt is not merely describing the language
of constitutional argument, but defending its proper contours, he is in the same
position as the normative grammarians of the Academie francaise, who are not
content to watch the language they love be degraded and debased by hordes of
speakers who seek to convert the incorrect into the correct, or the unacceptable
into the accepted. Like the Academie, Bobbitt seeks to intervene in the growth
and development of the language of constitutional discourse and keep it on its
proper course.
  The problem for Bobbitt concerns what his arguments about the proper
grammar of constitutional discourse seek to accomplish. At first glance, it might
seem that these arguments are arguments of justification, because they explain
how the language game of constitutional law should properly be carried out.
However, at many places in the book—for example, in the above quoted
passage— Bobbitt seems to claim that his goal is to explain how arguments
should be formed if they are to be legitimate. The difficulty is that Bobbitt's theory
of justification and legitimacy presupposes that one does not make normative
arguments for the superior legitimacy of one hypothetical social practice over
another. According to Bobbitt's own theory, the only legitimate practices are
those that actually exist; the only legitimate language games are those that are
currently being played, and their legitimacy in each case is established by the fact
that they do exist and are currently being played.
  If Bobbitt is explaining how constitutional arguments would have to be
formed if they are to be legitimate, he cannot be arguing that one practice of
constitutional argument would be more legitimate than another. He can only be
examining existing examples of talk about the Constitution to see whether they
match the existing forms of legitimate constitutional law talk he describes. In the
same way, he can only dismiss competing accounts of what constitutional
argument amounts to on the grounds that they do not match existing practice and
hence are not legitimate.35 Thus, he can be a normative grammarian only to the
extent that he is enforcing what existing practices currently are, which is to say, he
cannot be a normative grammarian at all, but only a descriptive one. As soon as he
recognizes a change in a practice, he must pronounce it legitimate, even if he
seriously opposes the change (and, by his own theory, he must oppose the
change from outside the practice as it is currently constituted). Similarly, if his
views about the proper forms of constitutional argument turn out to be wrong,
because they are outmoded or idiosyncratic, he must immediately renounce them
                                                
35 See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 126-40 (criticizing Mark Tushnet
for failing to understand the proper categorization of the six modalities of
argument).
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even if he believes that they are better. *1782 Because his project is purely
descriptive, he has no other basis for his views about what is grammatical and
ungrammatical.
  If Bobbitt held that one (hypothetical or existing) practice of
constitutional law could be more legitimate (and more grammatical) than another
practice, then legitimacy would not be something established by social practice. It
would be something established by arguments about what is better and worse; it
would be established by arguments of justification internal to some other practice.
Bobbitt would have abandoned the argument that legitimacy is conferred by the
mere existence of a shared social practice and would be asserting that legitimacy is
also conferred by a practice being justified by (for example) considerations of
moral or political theory. Conversely, it would be possible that the mere fact that a
social practice was accepted would not be sufficient to confer legitimacy upon it;
another practice, not yet accepted, or formally accepted, might have more
legitimacy. A return to past practices might increase legitimacy, even if those
practices had been superseded by later innovations.
  There is, of course, a third alternative, and it is one we would press
upon Professor Bobbitt. We believe that claims about grammaticality need not be
established wholly by the fact of social practice, but that they can also have a
normative component. This normative component, in turn, is partly derived from
what the grammarian believes are the best and most worthy features of the
practice, and partly derived from norms that may be wholly external to the practice.
Indeed, the decision as to what are the best and most worthy features of the
practice cannot be wholly internal to the practice, because it must make choices
about what parts of the practice are better or worse.
  Our judgments about what are the better and worse parts of social
practice, in turn, can have feedback effects on our description of the practice, for
they can affect judgments about what is normal and what is deviant within the
practice. In other words, we may decide that certain parts of the practice should be
regarded as deviant because they fail to conform as well with those parts we
regard as most worthy of continuation, even if the former are prevalent to some
degree. On the other hand, at some point, their mere prevalence will require us to
accept that these portions can no longer be regarded as deviant but must be
regarded as normal usage, and we must then acknowledge that the practice is not
as desirable or defensible as it could be. At that point, we will argue that a better
grammar would be an older one, or some combination of the old and the new.
  From Bobbitt's standpoint, the problem with this third alternative is that
it cannot maintain the strict separation between legitimacy (grammaticality) and
justification that he insists upon. First, grammar becomes an interpretive and
normative enterprise that may deviate from common *1783 practice to a
significant degree. Second, arguments about what is grammatical become infected
with considerations that are not wholly internal to the practice. While taking the
existing practice of constitutional law as a starting point for discussion, these
arguments also contemplate the possibility that the practice could be improved if
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it were changed slightly, and that significant portions of the practice are bad and
should be discarded as illegitimate. In this way, the criteria of what is grammatical
or legitimate and what is justified (from the standpoint of other language games)
unavoidably overlap and, what is more, come to depend upon each other.
Although they are by no means identical, they are interpenetrating and mutually
dependent.
  We think that Bobbitt's own arguments about the legitimacy of
constitutional forms of discourse show that he cannot maintain the distinction
between legitimacy and justification in practice. He cannot do so because he
wishes to be a normative grammarian of constitutional law as well as a descriptive
one. In the pages that follow, we offer a number of different but interlocking ways
in which the tensions inherent in the grammarian's role surface in his work. Each of
them, in its own way, shows the inevitability of an overlap between the
considerations of legitimacy and justification that Bobbitt is so determined to
avoid. Thus, we conclude that Bobbitt must either give up the fundamental
separation he proposes between the two sets of considerations, or he must give
up his stated project of "explicat[ing] and defend[ing]" our current practices of
constitutional argument, "where they are explicable and defensible."36 Because
we think that the latter is a deeper and more important motivation behind his
writings, we argue that it, and not the total separation between legitimacy and
justification, is worth preserving. Indeed, under our suggested approach, the
distinction between legitimacy and justification does not vanish, but merely
becomes a "nested opposition"—a conceptual opposition in which the two terms
have important relationships of mutual dependence even as they are also mutually
differentiated.37
  Thus, our point in suggesting this modification is not to argue that
legitimacy and justification are the same thing, or even to advance the well- worn
slogan that "law is politics." Our point is rather that legitimacy and justification,
while mutually differentiated, are also mutually dependent. The language of
constitutional law and the language of other forms of moral and political discourse
are not hermetically sealed off from each other, nor can they be viewed as running
on separate although parallel tracks. We cannot insist that the words that appear
in one have no relation to the words that appear in the other, in the same way that
we can insist *1784 that it is only accidental that a piece in one board game
resembles a piece that features in another. Language games are not closed in the
way that chess and checkers are. Language games continually borrow from each
other and poach on each other's territory. Indeed, that is one of the most
important ways in which they change and develop over time. Thus, we believe
that although the language game of constitutional argument is different from the
                                                
36 Id. at xii.
37 J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671, 1676  (1990)
(book review).
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language game of politics or that of morality, the three language games (and
indeed possibly others) are interpenetrating. They are not identical, but they have
linkages and allegiances that cannot be fully and finally distinguished and
separated.
IV. Bobbitt as a Normative Grammarian
  The first difficulty with Bobbitt's approach is that there may be more
than one way of characterizing and cataloguing the various forms of
constitutional discourse, and not all of these systems are completely coextensive.
For example, one of us (Balkin), along with Duncan Kennedy and others, has
offered accounts of legal arguments that differ in significant respects from
Bobbitt's. Kennedy and Balkin would classify arguments of institutional
competence as a form separate from utilitarian arguments of social policy and
social utility,38 while Bobbitt would claim that these institutional and substantive
arguments are all "prudential."39 Kennedy and Balkin recognize a specific class of
arguments about rights,40 while Bobbitt has no category of rights arguments in
his constitutional scheme. In his system, claims about rights are derivative from
other forms of argument.41 Thus, Bobbitt disagrees with these scholars as to how
to divide up and classify arguments about constitutional law. Hence it is possible
that certain arguments are accounted for in his system, while these arguments do
not form part of theirs, and vice versa. If Kennedy and Balkin insist on their
classification, are they beyond the legitimate practices of constitutional argument?
The dispute here is partly factual, but it is not wholly so. Bobbitt's claims cannot
be purely descriptive; they must rather be interpretive and normative claims about
what the forms of argument should be in order for them to possess legitimacy.
  A particularly interesting example of this problem is Bobbitt's denial that
natural law arguments—appeals to transcendental reason—form a *1785
legitimate modality of constitutional argument.42 To argue—as do many civil law
and even some British lawyers—that a given action violates the norms of natural
                                                
38 J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1986); Kennedy, supra note 20, at 79-80.
39 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 16-17, 101, 139.
40 Balkin, supra note 38, at 28-32, 83-89: Kennedy, supra note 20, at 79.
41 See BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 12-22 (showing how the various
modalities can be used to establish claims of constitutional rights).
42 BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 94-95, 163; BOBBITT, supra note 12, at
20-21, 135-37, 168.
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law is to place oneself outside the boundaries of acceptable constitutional
argument within the United States. Bobbitt does recognize a modality he calls
"ethical argument"; these are arguments that appeal to the ethos or character of
the American people mediated through their commitment to limited government.43
Bobbitt argues that ethical arguments infer "unenumerated rights . . . from the
limits of the enumerated powers" in the Constitution.44 Traditional natural law
arguments do not depend on the content of the enumerated powers that happen
to appear in the text of the Constitution at any particular time. By contrast,
Bobbitt's ethical arguments centrally depend upon a relationship to enumerated
powers; if these powers were different, so too would the basis of inference for
ethical arguments. Thus, Bobbitt would assert, natural law arguments for
decisions like Griswold v. Connecticut45  and Roe v. Wade46  are illegitimate
because they are constitutionally ungrammatical, but ethical arguments for these
decisions are perfectly grammatical and wholly consistent with the legitimate
practice of constitutional argument.47
  Unlike the other modalities of argument, Bobbitt's conception of ethical
argument seems unfamiliar and contrived. We ourselves are divided as to its
validity. One of us (Levinson) recognizes both natural law argument and a
separate category of "ethical argument"; he links the latter not to enumerated
powers, but to the idea of an "ethos" that exemplifies the deep structural norms of
a given culture. Of course, because this definition differs both from natural law
and Bobbitt's own notion of the "ethical," it suggests that there may be an eighth
modality.
  The other of us (Balkin) is more skeptical. He thinks that because the
three types of arguments overlap so significantly in coverage, it is more likely that
there is an interpretive disagreement over which characterization of these
                                                
43 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 20-21.
44 Id. at 103. Phrased this way, Bobbitt's "ethical argument" is very
similar to Douglas Laycock's inference of unenumerated rights from textual
argument. See Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously, 59 TEX.L.REV.
343, 360-93 (1981) (reviewing JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980)) (inferring unenumerated principles of "national unity," "individualism,"
and "personal autonomy").
45 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47 Indeed, one of the points of Constitutional Fate was to establish that
ethical arguments for Roe v. Wade were legitimate forms of constitutional
argument. BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 157-63.
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arguments is the correct one. Moreover, this disagreement cannot be purely
descriptive; it is unavoidably critical and normative. Balkin concedes that appeals
to positive morality—including appeals to tradition—*1786 may form a class of
arguments different from appeals to a transcendental morality, but he doubts that
Bobbitt's version of ethical arguments derived from inherent limitations on
enumerated powers forms a genuine category of argument. This category is more
likely a means for Bobbitt to avoid recognizing the legitimacy of natural law
argumentation.
  Bobbitt defends his rejection of natural law argument as a legitimate
category on the grounds that appeals to natural law argument are few and far
between in constitutional decisions.48 However, he reaches this conclusion only
by refusing to recognize among his examples of ethical argument many cases that
could just as easily be classified as natural law arguments.49 Thus, he fails to find
many natural law arguments simply because he has given them a different name.
  It is ironic that Bobbitt makes his case for the paucity of natural law
arguments by focusing only on the texts of judicial opinions of the U.S. Supreme
Court.50 This seems strangely in tension with his generally protestant approach
to constitutional interpretation, which argues that constitutional interpretation is a
practice open to and engaged in by not onlyjudges and lawyers but politicians
and citizens alike. If constitutional interpretation is such a practice, then we
should look for examples of the practice not merely in the language of judges but
also in the language of politicians, citizens, lawyers, and laypersons who claim to
be interpreting the Constitution. Therefore, the fact that natural law arguments
feature so prominently outside the language of the judiciary should not be a
reason to exclude them from the grammar of constitutional discourse, unless,
                                                
48 Philip Bobbitt, Remarks at Symposium on Recent Developments in
Political and Moral Theory, The University of Texas School of Law (Feb. 4, 1994).
49 See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 106-07 (characterizing Justice
Johnson's concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143-48 (1810) as
ethical argument).
50 For example, among courts, one might want to look at the practices of
lower federal courts and the state courts. Indeed, one might even want to look at
the opinions of state courts construing their own state constitutions, which, in the
19th century at least, had a considerable influence on the development and
growth of federal constitutional doctrine. For a discussion of the natural law
tradition in state constitutional law, see generally Suzanne Sherry, Natural Law in
the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171 (1992); Brian Snure, Comment, A Frequent
Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: Individual Rights, Free Government, and
the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH.L.REV. 669 (1992); Louis K.
Bonham, Note, Unenumerated Clauses in State Constitutions, 63 TEX.L.REV. 1321
(1985).
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contrary to Bobbitt's own stated views, we regard judges as the primary and
defining actors in constitutional interpretation.
  Indeed, we find it difficult to argue that natural law arguments have not
been an important part of the American political and legal tradition since the
Declaration of Independence. The Declaration's assertion of the self-evident truth
that "all men are created equal, [and] that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights"51  is as clear an *1787 appeal to transcendental
reason as one could wish for. Nor can one claim that the Declaration's political
conception did not find its way into legal understandings and, in particular, legal
understandings about the Constitution. As Edward Corwin noted in a famous
article aptly entitled Ihe "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, natural law thought— much of it inspired by the Declaration of
Independence or by the Lockean conception of natural law—has been prominent
in constitutional discourse from the beginnings of the republic onward.52 To give
only one example, in his recent book, Lincoln at Gettysburg, Garry Wills has
shown how Abraham Lincoln's interpretation of the Constitution was profoundly
affected by the Declaration's natural law vision, as were the views of the American
transcendentalists who in turn influenced Lincoln.53 Indeed, one seriously
distorts the constitutional views of antebellum abolitionists if one neglects the
importance of natural law approaches.54 So the denial of the natural law tradition
is seriously ahistorical, a surprising oversight for a constitutional scholar as
deeply interested in the historical traditions of American constitutionalism as
                                                
51 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
52 Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutional Law (pt. 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 394-409 (1929) (describing early
American controversies involving natural law and the natural law influence in the
early American republic). But cf. Gary L. McDowell, Coke, Corwin and the
Constitution: The "Higher Law Background" Reconsidered, 55 REV. POLITICS
393 (1993) (criticizing Corwin's use of Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.
1610)).
53 GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG 99-120 (1992).
54 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 21-23 (1988) (reviewing
the role of natural law in the antebellum understanding of liberty in law and
politics, and noting the particular importance of higher law ideas in the antislavery
movement); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon
Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV.
513, 525-38 (1974) (describing how natural law served, along with evangelical
religion and transcendentalism, to infuse the antislavery cause with principles of
higher law).
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Bobbitt. Nor is this tradition by any means exhausted: In modern times,
constitutional scholars like Suzanna Sherry,55 Philip Hamburger,56 and Hadley
Arkes57  have emphasized the continuing importance of natural law in
constitutional adjudication, as has Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas—at
least prior to his confirmation hearings.58 From the standpoint of cultural
anthropology or descriptive *1788 sociology then, natural law arguments are
hardly exceptional or deviant; they are pervasive features of our shared
constitutional culture.
  In contrast, Bobbitt's vision of "ethical" arguments derived from the
study of enumerated powers is sufficiently complicated and controversial that it is
doubtful that many people share his belief that such arguments form a central part
of our nation's discursive practices regarding the Constitution. If the prevalence
of practice is any guide as to the existing forms of constitutional argument, it is
much more likely that natural law arguments qualify as legitimate. Moreover, if the
self-understandings of participants in the practice of constitutional argument have
any relevance to the nature of the practice, there is something distinctly troubling
about a characterization of ethical argument that is scarcely reflected in any of the
writings of the participants themselves. Indeed, Bobbitt can only argue that
individuals throughout American constitutional history who thought that they
were making natural law arguments were simply deluded—they were really making
ethical arguments without knowing it. Furthermore, to the extent that their
arguments failed to match the template of ethical arguments, they were
ungrammatical. Yet, if anything seems ungrammatical, at least in the sense of
being unfamiliar and difficult to grasp and apply as a practice, it is Bobbitt's theory
of ethical argument.
                                                
55 E.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extratextual
Interpretation, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 157, 158 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen Gottlieb eds., 1991);
Suzanna Sherry, supra note 50, at 171-73; Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment:
Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1988).
56 E.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993).
57 E.g., HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND:
RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994); HADLEY
ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990).
58 E.g., Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
63 (1989); Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution—The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983
(1987).
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  This raises a quandary for Bobbitt's theoretical project. If most people
think and act and talk in natural law terms instead of thinking and acting and
talking in terms of ethical arguments, does this mean that most people are
mistaken about these matters and that they are not engaged in legitimate
constitutional argument when they think and act and talk in this way? Does this
mean that such arguments are ungrammatical—that they may be political or moral
arguments, but certainly not constitutional arguments? If so, can he really be
claiming to explain the actual practices of constitutional argument in this country,
or is he rather offering an account of what the discourse should look like if it is to
sustain legitimacy? If the latter is the case, then the mere fact that people do think
and act and talk in a particular way about the Constitution does not confer
legitimacy. Indeed, the presence of a historical tradition of natural law argument,
handed down, like others, from the common law, does not bestow either legitimacy
or constitutional grammaticality upon it. Legitimacy and correct grammar require
something more. But what is this extra thing?
  One might note as well that the example of natural law poses a greater
problem for Bobbitt than other disagreements about the boundaries or definitions
of various modes of arguments. In some cases, Bobbitt might happily concede
that another system of description—for example, one that separated prudential
arguments into institutional and noninstitutional arguments about
consequences—would leave his basic system untouched. We would simply be
dividing up the universe of available legal arguments *1789 differently. However,
the problem with replacing ethical arguments with natural law arguments is that
Bobbitt believes that the former, but not the latter, are legal arguments. Bobbitt is
insistent that one cannot equate the constitutional ethos with morality or cultural
norms. One reason is that "ethical" justifications can justify completely immoral
results.59 A more important reason, however, is that even when ethos and
morality appear on the surface to be coextensive, moral arguments belong to an
entirely different language game.60 The central point of Bobbitt's jurisprudential
theory is that legal arguments cannot be justified either by facts about the world
or by appeals to moral or political truth. Rather, legal justification must flow
entirely from within the accepted forms of legal argument itself. The problem with
natural law is that it seems to breach the boundary between the language game of
morals and the language game of the purely and exclusively legal.
  Bobbitt's second difficulty is that his theory assumes a basic
homogeneity of argumentative practices not only among professional elites but
also among the citizenry, who engage in constitutional law talk through call-in
shows, letters to the editor, and other forms of public debate. Nevertheless, it has
                                                
59 BOBBITT, supra note 26, at 163.
60 See BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 20-21 (arguing that one cannot equate
the constitutional form of ethical argument with moral argument in general).
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become more and more difficult to perceive such a consensus about practices of
argument even among professionally trained lawyers, much less between
laypersons and professionals. A case in point is Judge Harry Edwards's recent cri
de coeur concerning the irrelevance of much academic scholarship to the judicial
practice of constitutional law.61 Moreover, as Judge Richard Posner has recently
pointed out, there is increasing diversity on the bench that makes appeal to the
conventions of craft, a la Henry Hart or Herbert Wechsler, increasingly strained.62
  For better or worse, not everyone appears to be playing by the same
rules of constitutional argument, and it is not only adherence to natural law that
produces these problems. Some persons, especially lay citizens, may wish to inject
references to what they believe to be the revealed word of God into constitutional
discourse. For them, the list of six modalities is underinclusive (as it is for the
devotee of natural law).
  For others, on the other hand, the list is dangerously overinclusive.
Raoul Berger, for example, insists that original intention is the sole *1790
touchstone of constitutional legitimacy.63 Bobbitt believes that orginalists make a
fundamental mistake. They convert what is only one modality of constitutional
argument into a criterion for all constitutional interpretation. Bobbitt calls this
belief an ideology.64 One subscribes to an ideology if one holds that one modality
is superior to, supersedes, or explains all of the others. Thus, in Bobbitt's view,
Mark Tushnet also is an ideologue, not because his views are far to the left of the
political spectrum, but because Bobbitt characterizes Tushnet as holding that
prudential considerations trump all others in constitutional adjudication.65
                                                
61 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH.L.REV. 34 (1992).
62 See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 428,
424-28  (1990) (arguing that while it was possible to assert the autonomy of the law
in the 1950s, such an assertion is not possible today because the philosophies of
judges such as William Brennan and Antonin Scalia are "so distant from each
other ideologically that there is little common ground for discourse"); RICHARD
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 60-80 (forthcoming February 1995).
63 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 364 (1977)
(arguing that original intent is so important because "a judicial power to revise the
Constitution transforms tne bulwark of our liberties into a parchment barrier").
64 See BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 22 (explaining how each modality can
be used mistakenly to construct an ideology).
65 See id. at 139 (criticizing Tushnet's "assumption that prudentialist
thinkers do not merely offer yet one more form of argument").
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  In contrast to scholars like Berger and Tushnet, Bobbitt insists that all
of the modalities are of equal importance and equal legitimacy. Hence he believes
that ideologists are engaged in a deviant practice of constitutional argument. Of
course, the reverse is also true: an originalist like Berger would hold that Bobbitt's
embrace of ethical argument is fundamentally illegitimate. In terms of Bobbitt's
theory, Berger and other originalists are claiming that ethical argument, however
defined, is no more legitimate to the game of constitutional law talk than the
attempt to move a pawn like a knight is legitimate in the game of chess.
  Thus Bobbitt faces a dual problem. First, there may be no consensus on
the legitimate forms of constitutional argument. Second, there may be no
consensus concerning whether debates about the legitimate forms of
constitutional argument are themselves a legitimate part of constitutional
discourse. From Bobbitt's perspective, these debates should form only part of the
constitutional metalanguage, rather than part of constitutional discourse itself.
But as the Bergers, Borks, and Tushnets of the world multiply, they begin to
introduce questions of "constitutional theory"—that is, questions of what types
of arguments are legitimate—into the practice of constitutional discourse.
  Are Berger's, Bork's, and Tushnet's practices normal or deviant,
especially if from their standpoint Bobbitt's own practices might be regarded as
deviant? In order to answer these questions, Bobbitt must explain and justify his
criteria for identifying what counts as normal or deviant practices of constitutional
argument. He must offer an account of what makes his account a better
interpretation than proffered alternatives. In particular, he must show why one
type of practice is better and another type is worse when both can be found
within the spoken language of the *1791 native speakers of constitutional law
talk. Because a simple description of the actual practices of constitutional
argument cannot achieve these goals, his project must become both interpretive
and normative.
  A third problem with Bobbitt's theory is that it has difficulty accounting
for the possibility of changes in our constitutional grammar. If our practices of
constitutional argumentation are legitimate because they are how we live and how
we think, then if our practices change, they do not lose legitimacy, because this is
how we now live and now think. However, this will not do for Bobbitt because he
thinks that constitutional argument has changed for the worse because of the
work of the left and the right from the 1950s onward.66 These people have
misunderstood the nature of constitutional argument and have misled everyone
else. Thus, Bobbitt is worried that the discourse of constitutional law has been
thrown off track, that our constitutional grammar has been debauched. Political
considerations have leaked into the rhetoric of constitutional arguments made by
academics and judges; the right wing has converted the modality of originalism
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into an ideology of original intention. This is not how things should be.
Nevertheless, if this is what the practice of constitutional argument looks like circa
1994, then in an important sense Bobbitt has no grounds for complaint. To put it
another way, he may have grounds for complaint, but these grounds cannot be
fully internal to the existing practice of constitutional discourse. His project is a
critical and normative one that must look beyond the confines of what has
happened in order to separate out changes that are for the better and changes that
are for the worse.
  Bobbitt is, in short, in the perplexing position of the Academie francaise.
He is arguing that, regardless of the infiltration of discursive practices like those
of Robert Bork, Mark Tushnet, and countless other participants in constitutional
discourse, these grammatical practices are mistaken practices that should be
corrected, just as the expression "le hot dog" should be stricken forthwith from
the French language. In a word, people like Bork and Tushnet are being
ungrammatical, and if others follow their lack of grammaticality, the legitimacy of
the constitutional order will be destroyed. Thus, Bobbitt believes that the order of
constitutional discourse can change, and, what is more, that it can change for the
worse. But if so, then the existence of particular practices of constitutional
argument at a given time cannot, without more, constitute a sufficient account of
their legitimacy. Otherwise, the impurities of discourse introduced by the left and
right are not impurities at all—they are simply the direction in which constitutional
discourse is flowing, and *1792 hence, the direction in which the grounds of
legitimacy are flowing as well.67
                                                
67 Note that Bobbitt cannot simply argue for a return to past custom. If
past custom differs from current custom, then it is no longer how we live, and so
he must explain why the past language game is better than the present language
game. If one cannot make comparisons across language games, this becomes
impossible.
  Consider the claim that people speak English correctly only if they
speak English as it was spoken in the 17th century. This seems ludicrous because
we do not usually recognize trans-historical grounds of criticism for linguistic
development. But this suggests that the practices of constitutional argument may
be significantly different from those language games whose standards are wholly
internal.
  In fact, Bobbitt's practice deconstructs his theory. He does not accept
that whatever practices of constitutional argument eventually develop are
defensible, because he values our common law traditions and the traditions of
constitutional argument, at least before their recent deformations by the left and
the right. Thus, he necessarily invokes trans-historical comparisons of practices
and believes that prior practices are better than later ones. Bobbitt can avoid
acknowledging this directly only by claiming that no true changes have occurred
and that any deformations have not yet altered the "real" practice, which remains
fully intact. However, this is not a purely descriptive claim about the current
grammar of constitutional argument. There is an important sense in which
Bobbitt's work seems to privilege the past—what he calls our constitutional fate—
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  To argue that not all changes in our practices are legitimate, we must
accept the possibility that our grounds for legitimacy are not purely descriptive
but are also both interpretive and normative. Nor is this dispute fully separable
from the practice of constitutional argument itself. This dispute is part of that
discourse rather than anterior to it; it overlaps with the practice rather than being
excluded by it. The moment that Bobbitt's categories do not command universal
assent, much less seem idiosyncratic, he presages the mutual dependence
between the concepts of legitimacy and justification that his system is designed
to deny. He becomes a normative grammarian.
V. Modalities and Ideologies
  Some of the tensions inherent in Bobbitt's approach are revealed if we
imagine how a Senator Bobbitt might vote on nominations of persons appointed
to the Supreme Court of the United States. If a prospective Justice accepted
Bobbitt's rules of constitutional grammar and their centrality to the legitimacy of
constitutional interpretation, would there be any reason for Bobbitt to refuse to
vote for her? In particular, would her substantive views on constitutional issues
be irrelevant? Conversely, if a prospective Justice failed to respect his modalities,
or added ones Bobbitt did not recognize, would Bobbitt nonetheless be willing to
support her if she were otherwise likely to reach substantively desirable
interpretations of the Constitution?
  *1793 Bobbitt partially addresses these questions in a chapter on the
nomination of Robert Bork. One of his central theses is that the senators who
interrogated Bork wrongly assumed, as Bork did himself, that Bork is an
originalist. In fact, Bobbitt argues, Bork is best understood as a prudentialist.68
When one studies his arguments carefully, they reveal that Bork believes that the
Constitution should be interpreted so as to maximize the decisionmaking authority
of politically accountable institutions.69 Hence, Bork believes that any restraints
on these institutions should be clearly ascertainable within the Constitution, or so
enmeshed in long-settled practice and present-day expectations that it would be
                                                                                                  
simply because it is our past. This in itself places upon us a duty to preserve and
defend it. Ironically, this makes Bobbitt a sort of "originalist" with respect to the
language game of constitutional interpretation.
68 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 95.
69 One of us has described Bork as a "parliamentarian" who exhibits
"relative disdain for enduring constitutional values that limit temporal majorities."
Sanford Levinson, Parliamentarianism, Progressivism, and 1937: Some
Reservations About Professor West's Aspirational Constitution, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 283, 284 (1993).
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imprudent to disturb them. It goes without saying that Bork rejects the legitimacy
of "ethical" arguments, however defined.70 Bork is fundamentally concerned with
the consequences of interpretation for majoritarian political power—and hence his
philosophy is prudential under Bobbitt's classificatory scheme. In Bobbitt's view,
Bork is also an ideologue, because he privileges prudential considerations above
all others. Indeed, he is a self-deluded ideologue, because he privileges a different
modality from the one that he thinks he is privileging.
  According to Bobbitt, the senators who interrogated Bork were misled
by Bork's repeated rhetorical invocation of the Framers and original intention.71
Hence, they failed to focus on the real reasons why he should not have been
confirmed. Nevertheless, Bobbitt believes that one person at the hearings did
offer "the constitutional case against the nomination."72 This is Professor Barbara
Jordan, the former Texas Congresswoman who testified against Bork. In Bobbitt's
view, Professor Jordan hit upon the central difficulty in Bork's jurisprudence. The
problem "was not simply that he opposed the reapportionment, or the poll tax
decisions  of the Warren Court ."73 Instead, the problem was that " f or fifteen
years Robert Bork had been attacking the legitimacy of the means of judicial
reasoning that undergirded the Warren Court decisions."74 According to Bobbitt,
" i t was one thing to disagree on the way the rationale for a decision played out;
it was something else again to challenge *1794 the very method of rationalizing
itself."75 Bork had suggested that decisions based on certain modalities of
argument were per se illegitimate because they were based on those modalities. He
believed that only some of Bobbitt's modalities of constitutional arguments were
legitimate. This disqualified him in Bobbitt's eyes, for "an attack on those
modalities is an attack on the legitimacy of the decisions they support."76
  Bork sinned against the Constitution in a second way. Bobbitt holds
that not only are there six and only six modalities but that each is the equal in its
importance to its companions. No reader of Constitutional Interpretation can miss
                                                
70 See BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 103 ("I think it is fair to say that
ethical arguments . . . are the sort of thing that revolts Judge Bork.").
71 Id. at 98-99.
72 Id. at 106.
73 Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. at 108.
75 Id. at 107.
76 Id. at 108.
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Bobbitt's passion in arguing for the equality of their status. Although arguments
for one modality can be stronger than arguments for another in a particular
setting, there can be no privileged modality that is necessarily or even
presumptively superior to all others in all cases. As Stephen Griffin points out,
Bobbitt is thoroughly pluralist and insists, perhaps paradoxically, that everyone
recognize and accept the central truth of constitutional pluralism.77 One falls prey
to ideology whenever one privileges one modality above the others, and a fortiori
one is an ideologue if one completely rejects the legitimacy of any of the
modalities. Thus, even had Bork not denied the legitimacy of ethical argument, his
elevation of prudential argument above all other forms justified refusing to confirm
his nomination to the Supreme Court.
  Suppose, then, that a prospective Justice who otherwise showed good
character and judgment did not accept Bobbitt's particular classification of
constitutional modalities, whether because she thought them under- or over-
inclusive. Would this, without more, constitute sufficient reason for rejection?
Bobbitt's treatment of the Bork nomination suggests that he would look
skeptically on any nominee who called into question the legitimacy of one of the
six modalities of constitutional argument. Nevertheless, we have already noted
that one of these six—ethical argument—may be somewhat idiosyncratic.
Suppose then, that a nominee believed in the natural law tradition as an important
source of constitutional argument but not in Bobbitt's conception of ethical
argument. This would pose a dual problem for Senator Bobbitt. First, this nominee
would be denying the legitimacy of one of the six forms. Second, she would be
recognizing an additional form that Bobbitt does not consider legitimate. In such a
case, one wonders if Senator Bobbitt would consider her more or less suitable
than Judge Bork. The difficulty is that if failure completely to endorse Bobbitt's
grammatical system in its entirety is disqualifying, *1795 then it is likely that few
people in the United States would be qualified to serve on the Supreme Court.
This suggests that Bobbitt would perhaps be willing charitably to reinterpret
certain types of arguments as falling within his system. But if so, under what
conditions, and to what degree would or should Bobbitt invoke this charity?
  Conversely, suppose that a prospective Justice agreed that Bobbitt had
identified an exhaustive set of modalities and agreed as well that each was of
equal normative status. Would there be any remaining reason for Bobbitt to
oppose her? Would it matter, for example, that the nominee had exhibited a
propensity for arriving at politically obnoxious results while using constitutional
arguments that were in all respects grammatically unexceptionable?
  This second problem brings us to another important aspect of Bobbitt's
theory. This is his treatment of conflicting interpretations of the Constitution.
Suppose that, in a particular case, textual arguments and prudential arguments
                                                
77 Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation,  72
TEX.L.REV. 1753, 1762-65 (1994).
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point in opposite directions. In Bobbitt's view, the equal status of the modalities
means, by definition, that there is no way, within the modal structure itself, to
resolve conflicting interpretations across modalities. Instead, Bobbitt argues that
only the interpreter's conscience can resolve conflicts between the modalities.78
Hence only our own individual consciences can tell us whether a textual argument
is more persuasive in a given case than a prudential argument.
  Bobbitt's invocation of conscience seems deeply tied to his generally
protestant view of the Constitution. Just as the protestant must decide for herself
what scripture means, so too the protestant interpreter must search her
conscience for the best interpretation of the Constitution. Yet one wonders how
this attitude intersects with the duties of senatorial inquiry.
  In fact, Bobbitt's appeal to conscience suggests two quite different
ways that a Senator Bobbitt might characterize his constitutional duties in regard
to a prospective nominee. One possibility, already mentioned, is that if a nominee
assented to Bobbitt's system of legitimate constitutional argument, there would be
no reason to vote against her, because her constitutional decisions should be left
to her individual conscience. A second possibility, in contrast, would make this
conscience central to the Senate's investigation. Bobbitt might argue that because
all arguments within the six modalities are necessarily legitimate, a senator should
focus primarily on whether she believes that the prospective Justice has a good
conscience—that is, whether the Justice has good moral character and possesses
signs of goodmoral, legal, and political judgment.79 This *1796 position in turn
leads to all sorts of complexities—for example, could one look at past behavior as
demonstrating a more- or less-informed conscience? Although Bobbitt speaks of
the importance of conscience, he does not tell us very much about what it is or
how it works. Conscience for Bobbitt seems to be largely a black box; the heart
may have its reasons, but they are not otherwise subject to rational examination,
or so it appears. In any case, if Senate hearings were to become dominated by this
approach, they would, we do not doubt, look and sound considerably different
from the ones we are used to.
VI. Intra-Modal Conflict and the Role of Conscience
  In fact, Bobbitt's appeal to conscience raises, in yet another way, the
central difficulty with his theory—the ostensible separation of legitimacy and
justification. To see why this is so, we must return to Bobbitt's views about
conflicting interpretations of the Constitution. Under Bobbitt's system there are
actually two ways in which interpretive conflicts might arise. First, there can be
                                                
78 BOBBITT, supra note 12, at 168.
79 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and
Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747 (1992).
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conflicting arguments from different modalities. For example, suppose that Justice
X argues that prayer at public school graduations is unconstitutional because the
relevant precedents require it, while Justice Y argues that these decisions should
be overruled or limited and the practice held constitutional because the Framers
supported public prayer and never imagined that it would conflict with the First
Amendment. We might call this a cross-modal conflict, because doctrinal
arguments and historical arguments point in opposite directions.
  Second, there might be conflicting arguments within a single modality.
Suppose that Justice Z responds that Justice Y's history is incomplete or
mistaken, or that his interpretation of the Framers' intentions is pitched at too
narrow (or too broad) a level of generality. Instead, Justice Z argues that when
historical practice and intentions are correctly interpreted they point to the
unconstitutionality of the practice. This is an intra-modal conflict: Justice Z is
making a historical argument that conflicts with Justice Y's historical argument.80
For Justice Z at least, there is no cross-modal conflict because there is no conflict
between X's doctrinal argument and the proper understanding of history.
  Bobbitt's argument in Constitutional Interpretation about the role of
conscience is addressed only to the problem of cross-modal conflicts.
Nevertheless, intra-modal conflicts, to which Bobbitt's book devotes virtually no
attention, can be every bit as perplexing as cross-modal conflicts. They are
certainly every bit as frequent. For example, much *1797 constitutional argument
in the Supreme Court—and virtually all in the lower federal courts— involves
conflicting claims about precedent.81 The various briefs of amici routinely offer
contrasting prudential considerations. Constitutional historians often offer
contrasting historical interpretations, and so on. Although there are surely cases
in which a given modality can plausibly point in only one direction, often one can
make plausible arguments within a single modality for more than one result.
  The presence of intra-modal conflicts greatly complicates Bobbitt's
theory of cross-modal conflicts. At the very least, it becomes much more difficult
to be confident that such conflicts are truly present. Once we recognize the
possibility of intra-modal conflicts, many cross-modal conflicts turn out to be
illusory. For example, if there are historical arguments for and against the
constitutionality of school prayer, and doctrinal arguments for and against its
constitutionality, we cannot really say that the modalities of historical and
doctrinal argument conflict. That is because within each modality there is an
argument that agrees with an argument within the other modality. Rather, all we
                                                
80 This example is taken from the opinions of Justices Scalia and Souter
in Lee v. Wiseman, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1972).
81 See Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Inferior"
Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN.L.REV. 843 (1993).
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can say is that some (but not all) arguments within one modality conflict with
some (but not all) arguments in another modality.
  Because Bobbitt does not focus on intra-modal conflict, this problem
escapes his notice. He simply talks as if there were a single "textual position" that
conflicts with a single, equally clear "historical position" or "prudential position."
But this is false to ordinary experience. Very often one can find a prudential
argument to support a given historical argument, and vice versa. In such cases,
there will be no cross-modal conflict.
  Perhaps Bobbitt is really claiming that one must turn to conscience
when the best argument from one modality conflicts with the best argument from
another modality. Cross-modal conflicts, therefore, would be conflicts between the
best arguments within two different modalities. To return to our school prayer
case, it may be true that there are historical arguments that point in opposite
directions. But some of these arguments are better than others. If the best
historical argument is in accord with the best doctrinal argument, we do not really
have a cross-modal conflict, and so we do not need to turn individual conscience.
Quite the contrary: the best arguments from these two modalities reinforce and
support each other. There is true cross-modal conflict only when we are quite sure
that the best historical argument conflicts with the best prudential argument, or
the best ethical argument, and so on.82
  *1798 However, this reasoning has a curious consequence. We do not
know whether an appeal to conscience is even necessary until we know whether
we have located the best argument within each modality. In other words, cross-
modal conflict—the major concern of Bobbitt's book—is parasitic on the prior
resolution of intra-modal conflicts, about which he has almost nothing to say.
However, without attention to the problem of intra-modal conflict, he cannot be
sure how important or widespread is the central problem he is concerned with in
Constitutional Interpretation. For example, suppose it were the case that for a
given constitutional problem there was no best historical argument and no best
prudential argument, but only competing and plausible arguments within both
modalities. Then we never even face a cross-modal conflict. Thus, perhaps
surprisingly, Bobbitt's approach must presume the existence of a "right answer
thesis"—at least within each modality—if his theory of cross-modal conflict is to
have any practical interest. Put another way, his theory of cross-modal conflict
has little importance for constitutional questions when there is no single best
answer to a constitutional question within a given modality. 83
                                                
82 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1239-40 (1987) (arguing
that the best arguments in different modalities often reinforce each other).
83 We should add the caveat that it is theoretically possible that a
cross-modal conflict could exist even if there were no best answer to a given
constitutional question within a given modality. Suppose that, in the historical
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  Because Bobbitt tells us nothing about the resolution of intra-modal
conflicts, we cannot be sure whether he believes that there is always, sometimes,
or never a best answer to constitutional questions within a given modality.
Furthermore, if there is a best answer, it is possible that individual conscience
plays a role in determining what that best answer is. If so, the best answer for one
individual might not be the best answer for another because their consciences will
lead them in different directions.
  There are three possibilities we might consider: The first is that
resolving intra-modal conflicts never requires recourse to individual conscience.
The second is that resolving intra-modal conflicts always requires recourse to
individual conscience. The third is that some intra-modal conflicts, but not others,
require recourse to individual conscience.
  The first alternative would argue that, in intra-modal conflicts, resort to
conscience is unnecessary: one merely appeals to the standards of textual
argument to resolve textual disputes, to the standards of historical argument to
resolve historical disputes, and so on. However, this argument seems *1799
unpersuasive. Often the very question of how history and text should be used in
proving propositions of law is itself a matter of considerable dispute within a
community. For example, a historical situation or practice or the intentions of the
Framers can be described in different ways and at different levels of generality.
The choice of level of generality is particularly important, for the concrete
intentions of the Framers may be in conflict with their more general commitments
to liberty, equality, and democratic self-government.84 If so, which intentions are
                                                                                                  
modality, we could not tell whether A, B, or C was the best argument, and in the
prudential modality we could not tell whether D, E, or F was best. Here we assume
that A, B, and C represent mutually inconsistent positions, as do D, E, and F. We
further postulate that there is no equally good or better argument within each
modality. If all of the positions A, B, and C are inconsistent with each of the
positions in D, E, and F, we would still have a cross-modal conflict. All of the
candidates for the best historical argument take positions inconsistent with each
of the candidates for the best prudential argument, and vice versa.
84 See J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1618(1990). For a version of this
argument coming from an unexpected source, see Nomination of Robert H. Bork to
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 284-86 (1987),
in which Judge Bork argued that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
was correctly decided because the Framers' more abstract commitment to equality
proved historically incompatible with their more concrete commitment to the
constitutionality of separate-but-equal institutions.
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to control in a given case? Faced with these difficulties, we might wonder whether
conscience does not have an important part to play in their resolution.
  This point has even greater force in prudential argument. Prudential
arguments concern which rule would have the best consequences.85 But this
judgment requires a number of collateral judgments. We must first discern which
individuals, groups, institutions, or parts of society we are concerned with: are we
concerned about consequences to the institution of the Supreme Court, the
federal government, the poor, or the nation as a whole? We must decide how far in
the future consequences are to be considered. We must decide how to deal with
our lack of knowledge about consequences and who should bear the burden of
proof on matters that cannot be known for certain. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, in order to assess whether consequences are good or bad, we must
decide what our "ends" are: We must decide whether our goal is to maximize
pleasure, or happiness, or human dignity, or wealth, or the international
competitive position of the steel industry. Surely, in making these judgments,
individual conscience must play a significant role.
  In short, although Bobbitt assigns conscience to the role of arbitrating
between modalities, there are good reasons to believe that it would have to play a
significant role in disputes within a given modality. If so, we might consider the
second alternative: perhaps individual conscience is necessary to resolve all
intra-modal conflicts, just as it is necessary to resolve all cross-modal conflicts.
  Nevertheless, this position has its own difficulties. When two plausible
arguments are offered within a given modality, conscience may be necessary to
decide between them. But some arguments are not even remotely plausible.
Imagine a judge who claimed that the text of the *1800 Constitution guarantees
three senators for each state, insisted that the Framers believed that the death
penalty was in all cases cruel and unusual punishment, or argued that New York
Times v. Sullivan86  allows the states to proscribe negligently defamatory
statements about public officials. Although these legal arguments might seem
grammatical on their face, they are so wrong that we might seriously doubt either
the honesty or the competence of the person who made them. It is hard to believe
that these arguments can be rejected only on the grounds of individual
conscience.
  This brings us to the third alternative: some intra-modal conflicts require
resort to individual conscience, but others involve arguments that are so poorly
made that they can and must be rejected on grounds other than those of
conscience. However, what is this ground? It cannot be simply that these
arguments are wrong, for plausible arguments can also be wrong. Must we
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determine their incorrectness through the use of our consciences? A better
explanation might be that these arguments do not really follow the rules of the
practice of constitutional argument. An "off the wall" precedential argument fails
to use the rules of precedent correctly, an "off the wall" historical argument
violates accepted practices of historical accuracy, and so on. If this accurately
describes the situation, then the problem is not that these interpretations are bad
arguments, but that they are illegitimate ones. They arepseudo-arguments that
only pretend to be within a modality, but are not in fact really within it. A person
who makes them simply does not understand how to make arguments within the
modalities, as evidenced by the fact that she makes them while simultaneously
claiming to play the rules of the game. Thus, we would say that a person who
claims that the text of the Constitution guarantees each state three senators
simply does not understand what a textual argument is.
  Thus, some intra-modal conflicts are pseudo-conflicts, and others are
real conflicts. The former involve opposing arguments, some of which can be
rejected because they are not even part of the language game of constitutional
law. No appeal to conscience is necessary because the rules of the relevant
language game resolve the matter. The latter conflicts involve a choice between
legitimate, grammatical legal arguments. In this case, the choice between opposing
arguments requires justification and an appeal to conscience. 87
  The division between pseudo- and real conflicts within a modality
recapitulates the distinction between legitimacy and justification in yet *1801
another way. Some arguments are sufficiently bad that they are simply
ungrammatical, while other arguments, though unpersuasive, are not so bad that
they are beyond the boundaries of the language game of constitutional argument.
Some arguments can be dismissed because they are not even legal arguments,
while others can be refuted only through a process of justification that invokes
the aid of individual conscience.
  We have argued repeatedly that Bobbitt cannot maintain a strong
distinction between legitimacy and justification and that the nested opposition
between them will reappear continually despite Bobbitt's best efforts to
distinguish and separate the two.88 We can see the problem emerging once again
in the context of intra-modal conflicts. We might pose the problem this way: Is
there a clear boundary between arguments that are merely unpersuasive yet
clearly recognizable exercises in constitutional interpretation, and arguments that
are "off the wall," defying the accepted norms of constitutional argument and the
                                                
87 Hence, our second alternative might be rehabilitated in the following
way: all real intra-modal conflicts, like all cross-modal conflicts, require the use of
individual conscience to be resolved. Stated in this fashion, the second and third
alternatives become essentially identical.
88 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
1994 CONSTITUTIONAL GRAMMAR 33
33
existing grammar of constitutional law talk? Is there a bright line that separates the
unpersuasive from the ungrammatical—a line recognized and recognizable by all
members of the law-language community? Or do these categories fade into each
other at the margin, so that there are contested and contestable examples over
which equally competent members of the community might disagree?
  However many cases fall clearly and unmistakably into one of these two
categories, we believe that there is also a gray area in between, in which
reasonable persons can differ about whether a particular argument is competent
albeit unpersuasive or is truly "off the wall." A good analogy is the difficulty
federal judges have faced in devising a clear-cut boundary between frivolous legal
arguments that may be sanctioned under Rule 1189  and non-frivolous arguments
that, no matter how unpersuasive, draw forth no sanctions or accusations of
disqualifying ineptitude.90 The difficulty of distinguishing the ungrammatical from
the merely unpersuasive at the margins is consistent with our stated view that,
although legitimacy and justification are not the same thing, considerations of
legitimacy will almost inevitably fade, at the margin, into those of justification.91
                                                
89 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
90 See Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know
Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986); cf. Sanford Levinson,
Accounting for Constitutional Change (or, How Many Times Has the United
States Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) > 26; (D) All of the
above), 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 409, 411-15 (1991) (noting the difficulty of
drawing clear-cut distinctions between interpretations and amendments of the
Constitution, a distinction that depends in part on what kinds of arguments are
considered "off the wall").
91 One way to avoid the problem of disagreements at the margin is to
assert that if some people think that particular argument is grammatical while
others do not, perhaps the latter but not the former are not really competent
members of the law-language game. Thus, Bobbitt might insist that only
professionally trained lawyers—as opposed to lay persons, who seem too fond of
natural law or religious arguments—determine what is in the language game of
constitutional argument. Of course, this simply raises new difficulties. First, it
begs the question as to how the grammarian defines the criteria that determine
membership in the relevant language game. These judgments quickly leave the
realm of the purely descriptive and are often just another form of grammatical
policing. Second, this solution does not solve the difficulty of disputes between
members of the newly defined language community. If Robert Bork—a former
federal judge, Solicitor General of the United States and Yale Law School
professor—disagrees with Philip Bobbitt—a former member of the Office of
Counsel to the President and legal counsel of the Senate Select Committee on
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition— over what
constitutes a well-formed constitutional argument, how much more can the
linguistic community be pruned in order to create a consensus?
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  *1802 Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that Bobbitt himself could
accept such a view. For him, legitimacy is not something that one argues about, or
something that could be a matter for interpretation. Legitimacy is something that
happens because and to the extent that individuals are engaged in a language
game of law talk. Hence, considerations of legitimacy cannot fade into those of
justification because there are no such things as "considerations of legitimacy."
In Bobbitt's view, legitimacy and justification are two completely different kinds of
things, and to confuse them is to make a category mistake—the jurisprudential
equivalent of mixing apples and oranges. Thus, the distinction between legitimacy
and justification is not like the distinction between day and night—which fade
into each other—but more like the distinction between a day and a metric ton. In
this sense, there really are no close cases between merely bad or unpersuasive
arguments and illegitimate arguments, any more than there can be close cases
between what is a legal move in chess and what is not. For if there were close
cases, then it would mean that there could be reasonable arguments on both sides
of the question whether a given argument was within the language game or not.
But in Bobbitt's system, one does not argue about or demonstrate legitimacy—
legitimacy simply occurs by playing within the rules of the language game.
VII. Conclusion
  All of the difficulties we have identified in Bobbitt's project flow from
his insistence that the concepts of legitimacy and justification be kept separate.
We think this insistence is unnecessary to his more general project of offering a
grammatical study of constitutional law—a project that we heartily endorse.
Moreover, we think that it is false to how languages and practices grow and
develop over time. Language games lack purity: they refuse clear-cut boundaries,
they borrow and steal from other sources, they overlap with other language
games, and their governing rules are always in a state of flux and disputation.
Lived language games are unruly and unkempt, untamed and untidy, much as life
itself is. We do not doubt that Professor Bobbitt, like his mentor Wittgenstein,
would fully agree. *1803 Yet in his moments as normative grammarian, Bobbitt
still longs to preserve a certain purity within the language game of constitutional
argument. We think this attempt is doomed to failure. Living language games are
the products of history: they are motley and variegated, often chaotic, and always
jerry-rigged. Their heterogeneity continually reasserts itself, especially when, as
with constitutional legal argument, they are both a means and an object of intense
political dispute. Such language games are both a terrain of cultural struggle and a
potential prize in that struggle; they always frustrate the attempts of grammarians,
normative and descriptive alike, to police their asserted boundaries and preserve
their imagined purity. We think this lesson has general significance beyond the
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confines of American constitutional law; in any case, it is at least something to
muse on, quand on mange le Big Mac avec les fries.
